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Using National Security to Undermine Corporate Accountability
Litigation: The ExxonMobil v. Doe Controversy
Melody Saint- Saens I and Amy J. Bann2
I. Introduction
The convergence of the war on terrorism and the drive for
meaningful corporate accountability affect the development of legal
strategies to address corporate misbehavior in international law. This
comment explores the recent shift in U.S. foreign policy that focuses on
national security and the war on terrorism and its relationship to
litigation in U.S. courts on behalf of plaintiffs located outside the United
States against abusive multinational corporations. Specifically, the
ExxonMobil v. Doe case filed on behalf of plaintiffs in Indonesia and the
United States State Department's letter urging the case's dismissal are
analyzed as an example of this foreign policy shift.
Section II provides an overview of the litigation strategies that
have been utilized to prosecute corporations in the United States and
evaluates their progress. It also presents alternative strategies and
assesses pending litigation. Section III explains why plaintiffs abroad are
seeking redress in U.S. courts. The noteworthy Unocal litigation is
discussed in light of its possible impacts on the case in point. Section IV
outlines the circumstances surrounding the ExxonMobil case and the
U.S. government response. Next, it provides an analysis of these
developments and posits what the future may hold for human rights
litigants.
1The co-author is currently a student at the University of Miami School of Law;
B.A. International Relations, Spanish, Wellesley College; participated in the
Junior Year Abroad Exchange Program at the Universidad de San Andrds,
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Ms. Saint-Saens has worked on a number of human
rights issues including immigration remedies under VAWA for battered
immigrant women at the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Inc., Miami,
Florida, and on the death penalty at the California Appellate Project, San
Francisco, CA.
2 The co-author is currently a student at the University of Miami School of Law;
M.A. Political Science & International Development, Virginia Polytechnic and
State University; B.A. Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic and State
University; completed study session at the International Institute of Human
Rights, Strasbourg, France. Ms. Bann conducted litigation research and writing
on the Unocal case as a summer 2001 law clerk at EarthRights International
(EIU) and has continued work on ATCA litigation through pro bono research
projects. She also worked with the International- Right-to-Know Coalition by
editing proposed legislation at ERI, writing legal commentary, and presenting on
the topic at a national conference.
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H. Strategies Utilized to Sue Corporations for Wrongs
Committed Abroad Under the ATCA and TVPA
A. Nature of Litigation In U.S. Courts
Traditional litigation strategies for this issue are burdened with
numerous procedural, jurisdictional, and substantive barriers that cripple
their ability to provide meaningful remedies. Claims must be
constructed narrowly to be remotely viable, which limits the effect of
precedent or development of accepted jurisprudential standards?
Weakened precedent results in a fragmented sense of authority and the
purposeful avoidance of any sweeping legal policy regarding such
claims. Additionally, if a claim does pass the difficult jurisdictional and
procedural requirements, actual redress for plaintiffs is not timely.
However, the courts may provide useful precedent by legitimizing
corporate accountability principles in relation to social practices as well
as the viability of international law norms in domestic claims. Litigation
is one strategy aimed at holding corporations accountable for wrongs
committed outside the auspices of domestic environmental laws. With
increased liability for corporate entities and a national accountability
structure in place, litigation can continue as a bow in the quiver of
international lawyers.
B. Strategies Utilized: Domestic Litigation
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act
1. Overview
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)4 has been used in actions
against corporations in recent years in international human rights and
environmental law.5 It provides that: "[t]he district courts shall have
3 See Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L. L. 545 (2000) (a thorough
exposition and discussion on this topic).
'28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
5 See e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9
th Cir. 2001); Does I thru XXII v. Advanced
Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93
Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y.) Apr. 11, 1994; Aguinda v. Texaco, 200
WL 122143 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.31, 2000); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2nd Cir.
1998); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2000); In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2 nd Cir. 1987); Beanal v.
Freeport McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. LA 1997); Ivanowa v. Ford
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original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."6  Although other avenues, such as common law property or
fraud claims under state laws, may be available, the ATCA has been the
primary litigation vehicle for suing U.S. corporations at home for wrongs
committed abroad. Most cases have been brought by non-state actors
such as non-governmental organizations on behalf of plaintiffs. Its
potential for addressing such claims is vast, but to date cases have shown
limited results marred by a host of burdens in getting claims heard, let
alone testing its ability to provide meaningful redress.
ATCA litigation has been used in human rights, labor, and
environmental cases. The human rights and labor claims have involved
security arrangements in which the American company hires a foreign
military force to "protect" its facilities or instances of torture, forced
labor, and other abuses.7 Only a few human rights claims have been
successful to some degree. That area of law is more settled and widely
accepted than international environmental law. Complex procedural
hurdles have stalled or prevented most cases from being considered on
the merits. For instance, doctrines such as political question, sovereign
immunity, forum non conveniens, international comity, collateral
estoppel, separation of powers, standing, high transactional costs, and act
of state requirements can bar claims.
8
2. Challenges and Problems in Succeeding
Under the ATCA
a. Demonstrating International Customary Law
The largest problem for scholars and practitioners is identifying
what constitutes the "law of nations" under the ambiguous language in
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). There are numerous ATCA cases
on behalf of individuals, including: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir.
1980); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding that private
individuals, regardless of whether they acted under the "color of state law," can
be held liable for certain violations of international law); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
7 Sarah J. Adams Lien, Employers Beware? Enforcing Transnational Labor
Standards in the States Under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L 311, 313-15 (2002).
8 Jean Wu, Pursuing International Environmental Tort Claims Under the ATCA:
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 487, 493 (2001).
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the statute.9 The "law of nations" means international law defined as
"those laws governing the legal relations between nations," and the
"relations with persons, whether natural or juridical."' Courts have
interpreted this expression to mean those norms that are universal,
obligatory and definable." Certain human rights violations have risen to
this level and are considered customary law. The three-part test for
deciding which jus cogens norms of international law fall under the
ATCA is that the corresponding tort must be: (1) definable, (2) universal,
and (3) obligatory.12 In U.S. courts these have included torture, summary
execution, genocide, war crimes, disappearance, arbitrary detention,
slavery and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.'3
No plaintiff has yet to demonstrate that the "law of nations"
includes environmental torts, but several claims have been brought and
existing contemporary literature suggests that it does. A district court
said that an environmental claim under the ATCA must be an egregious
breach of universally recognized principles of international law inAmlon
Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.14 In that case, a European company brought
an action against an American company under a U.S. environmental
statute for fraudulent transfer of waste, arguing violation of a United
Nations declaration. 5 International environmental legal norms do not
yet enjoy consensus concerning their legal status, and have probably not
acquired the acceptance necessary to be crystallized into principles of
customary international law. 16 In Beanal v. Freeport McMoRan,17 an
Indonesian citizen sued for environmental destruction and pollution
9 Id. at 492.
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 816, 886 (West 6"h ed. 1990).
11 Lisa Lambert, At the Crossroads of Environmental and Human Rights
Standards: Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to Hold
Multinational Corporate Violators of International Laws Accountable in U.S.
Courts, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 132 (2000).
12 Tel- Oren, 726 F. 2d at 774; Sarah Hall, Multinational Corporations Post-
Unocal Liabilities for Violations of International Law, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L.
REv. 401,408 (2002).
13 Sarah M. Hall, Multinational Corporations' Post-Unocol Liabilities for
Violations of International Law, GEO. WASH. J. INT'L. L. 401, 408 (2002).
14 Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See
Cyril Kormos et al., U.S. Participation in International Environmental Law and
Policy. 13 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L. L. 661, 681 (2001).
15 Kormos et al., supra note 14.
16 Halina Ward. Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through
National Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 451, 462 (2001).
17 Beanal v. McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5thCir. 1999).
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against a U.S. based multinational corporation operating an open- pit
mine. 8  The court held that the plaintiff failed to show that
environmental rights are universally recognized and are governed by
articulable standards. However, it did not address the bulk of
environmental instruments and declarations that do establish a right to a
healthy environment. 19 This case symbolizes a setback of such claims
but is not indicative of the state of the law on this topic because claims in
other circuits are currently pending?
b. Issues of Federal Power
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed any ATCA
cases involving human rights, labor, or environmental claims; the
litigation landscape in this area could change dramatically if it does. An
area of contention is whether the statute actually creates a private right of
action and if so whether liability is imposed upon private actors for
private conduct.21 The tension surrounding foreign affairs in involved
countries constitutes an additional concern relevant to pursuing litigation
in the U.S. for human rights, labor, or environmental violations
committed abroad. The U.S. courts may be concerned about separation
of powers issues, and could claim that the action is barred because the
executive should "speak with one voice" on issues of foreign policy if it
characterized the claim as such. Courts can use doctrines of judicial
abstention such as political question and act of state to duck such cases
2
Countries where the actions occur may consider litigation elsewhere to
18 Wu, supra note 8.
19 Richard Herz, Text of Remarks on Panel: "Indigenous Peoples,
Environmental Torts and Cultural Genocide." HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 503, 505 (2001).20 Id. (Pending litigation is discussed in a following section.)
21 Wu, supra note 8, at 493.
22 William J. Aceves, Affirming the Law of Nations in US. Courts, FEDERAL
LAWYER 33, 38 (June 2002). India was not granted jurisdiction in the United
States against Union Carbide after the Bhopal disaster on the grounds that the
claims should be brought in India where the damage occurred, demonstrating
U.S. courts' hostility to foreign tort claims. Ward, supra note 16, at 456;
Hanlon, Patrick, Matthew Hoffman, Shea & Gardner. Availability of US.
Courts for Asbestos Actions Arising out of Non-US. Exposures, in AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, ABA COURSE OF STUDY: ASBESTOS LAW AND LITIGATIONS 42,
42-45 (2001); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in
Dec., 1984, F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)., aff'das modified, 809 F.2d 195
(2d Cir. 1987).
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be an infringement on their territorial sovereignty and want to adjudicate
matters at home.23
Currently, an overall assessment of international human rights,
labor, or environmental claims under the ATCA reveals that their
chances for success are not great, but are possibly actionable.14 Success
depends upon many factors and the legal climate could change favorably
or become more hostile as current events unfold. Litigants should pay
acute attention to issues of federal power in order to employ the full
potential of ATCA claims for environmental wrongs.
C. Procedural Hurdles
Likely the most difficult procedural hurdle in bringing an ATCA
suit, forum non conveniens has prevented some claims from going
forward. This doctrine allows for the dismissal of a case without
prejudice if the court otherwise has proper jurisdiction and venue, and an
alternative forum must be shown to exist.25 It is an important
consideration for litigants in which the alternate forum might be a
foreign jurisdiction. 26 Courts and defendants do not want to deal with the
physical distance, choice of law issues, difficulty of depositions, and
other aspects of litigation that become cumbersome with claims
involving foreign countries.27  Because of the severe nature of a
dismissal under forum non conveniens ruling, plaintiffs bringing suit
should carefully evaluate choice of venue. However, the challenge
should not prevent lawyers from carefully crafting pleadings as it is
possible to succeed.28 The Court denied the forum non conveniens
motion in Unocal. The current Chevron litigation adds that the law
seems to expressly provide for U.S. jurisdiction, so forum nons should
not be the norm.29 In contrast, a court dismissed a class action on behalf
of Ecuadorian citizens for large-scale environmental harms on forum non
conveniens grounds.
30
23 Ward, supra note 16, at 459.
24 See Kormos, supra note 14, at 683.
25 Lambert, supra note 11, at 127.
26 id.
27 id.
28 See generally Aric Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining
Forum non Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1046 (2001).
29 Hall, supra note 13, at 408.30 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y.) Apr.
11, 1994), adhered to by 850 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), dismissed by 945 F.
Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated., Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2nd Cir.
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Personal jurisdiction represents another possible stumbling block
for ATCA plaintiffs. If the defendant's contacts with the United States
are unclear, the court could choose not to hear the case.31 American
corporations, under International Shoe,s2 generally have the necessary
minimum contacts necessary with the United States, but certain
situations may be more difficult. For example, a company may be
incorporated in the U.S. but conduct most of its manufacturing abroad;
its stock might be owned by foreigners, or the primary defendants might
be subsidiaries.33
International comity, the practice of deferring to another state's
acts, laws, or jurisdictions, invokes sovereignty issues. State law claims
and ATCA claims were dismissed on these grounds inAguinda34 as well
as other cases.35 Other possible stumbling blocks include the courts
looking to whether a "true conflict between domestic and foreign law"
exists, and/or whether the U.S. has an interest in prescribing conduct, and
interests of the international system and foreign state.36 Requirements
concerning the act of state doctrine are unresolved due to the absence of
a definitive standard for determining when the factual nature renders a
claim to be precluded from substantive analysis. Attorneys considering
bringing suit under the ATCA for human rights, labor, or environmental
harms must remain cognizant of these pitfalls and draft complaints
gingerly.
d. Security Matters for Foreign Plaintiffs
Security concerns are prevalent in litigating wrongs on behalf of
those not in the United States. Plaintiff pseudonimity has been used in
1998), on remand, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 745 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000).
Another reason the court dismissed the case was the fact that Texaco was
willing to participate in adjudication in Ecuador. Lambert, supra note 11, at 13231 Hall, supra note 13, at 407 ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) permits
federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over any person or corporation
that has sufficient contacts with the United States, but that lacks contacts with
any individual state").
32 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
33 Hall, supra note 13, at 407.
34 Herz, supra note 1, at 571.
35 See Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (1994); Torres v. Southern Peru
Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd, 113 F.3d 540 (5t, Cir.
1997).
36 Herz, supra note 1, at 570-71.
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recent U.S federal cases for non-U.S. nationals to sue corporations. 3 7
Federal courts common use of this mechanism reveals a sensitivity and
38understanding of the severe harms occurring. The necessity of using
anonymity is grave when victims' lives may be threatened if their
identities are revealed. The challenges inherent in using pseudonyms
originate in the value the American justice system places on due process
rights.39 Particularly during discovery, defendant's counsel will almost
always merit some conditional disclosure, and the resulting protective
orders vary according to circumstance.
40
Plaintiffs lawyers should be aware of these concerns and only
pursue claims when the plaintiffs are willing to face the possible dangers
of inadvertent disclosure. It is imperative that counsel has close,
competent assistance from professionals familiar with the specific
locality and people. Despite the difficulties in maintaining
communication with plaintiffs and striking the balance between security
and due process rights, pseudonyms should continue to be utilized
because many plaintiffs would not be able or willing to step forward
without a high degree of protection.
e. Non-legal Barriers
Non-legal barriers, such as the political climate and the state of
the economy, also affect ATCA litigation. If the focus in Washington
and elsewhere is on national security and domestic protection, judicial
willingness to prosecute American corporations for their activities abroad
may decrease. Likewise, if the economy becomes tight,
nongovernmental organizations or other funders may face more
difficulties in bringing ATCA claims on behalf of aggrieved plaintiffs. A
group that might have been interested in doing so may turn to matters
that are more urgent and practical, rather than plunging into lengthy
litigation. However, the focus on corporate scandals surrounding
companies such as Enron and WorldCom may lend to a heightened
interest in developing meaningful corporate accountability measures.
37 Jed Greer, Plaintiff Pseudonymity and the Alien Tort Claims Act: Questions
and Challenges. 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 517 (2000).
3 Id. at 558.
'9 Id, at 563.40 Id. at 559.
41 Such initiatives include: Natural Heritage Institute, Nautilus Institute for
Security and Sustainable Development, Human Rights Advocates. CALIFORNIA
GLOBAL CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, BEYOND GOOD DEEDS: CASE
STUDIES AND A NEW POLICY AGENDA FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
(2002).
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C. The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 2 passed in
1992, complies with the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.43 The TVPA codifies
torture victims' right to sue by providing U.S. citizens with the same
right to sue in U.S. court that the ATCA gives aliens to sue for torture or
extra-judicial killing.4 The TVPA differs from the ATCA in that it is
limited to civil suits (the ATCA is not), it contains an exhaustion of
remedies requirement for the place where the conduct occurred, and has
a ten- year statute of limitations.45 Although lawsuits filed under the
TVPA enjoy considerably less procedural challenges than ATCA claims
because they involve plaintiffs located in the U.S., forum non
conveniens, doctrines of judicial abstention, and international comity
may be applicable.
At present, the TVPA has not been a successful tool to prosecute
corporations on its own, but has been useful on behalf of individuals
prosecuting individuals. For example, the Center for Justice and
Accountability in San Francisco has represented several victims in civil
suits and won in June 2002 in a federal district court in Miami, Florida.46
D. Pending Litigation
Ongoing ATCA litigation includes a case filed on July 20, 2002
in federal district court in Miami against Coca-Cola for human rights
abuses including killings and torture of union leaders at its plant in
Columbia that was filed on July 20, 2002.47 Plaintiffs SINALTRA1NAL,
42 28 U.S.C § 1350 (1999); Hall, supra note 13, at 415 (Section (a) states: "An
individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation--(l) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to
extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the
individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an
action for wrongful death).
43 Aceves, supra note 22, at 36.
44 Hall, supra note 13, at 415.
4 28 U.S.C § 1350a-1350c (1999).
46 Cases include: Armando Fernando Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325; Mehinovic
v. Vukovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002). See www.cja.org (The
Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA) brings civil lawsuits in U.S. courts
against human rights violators who live, visit or keep assets in the U.S.).
4 See Press Release, United Steel Workers/International Labor Rights Fund,
Coca-Cola (Coke) To Be Sued For Human Rights Abuses In Colombia; Coke
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the union that represents bottlers at the Coke plant in Columbia, allege
that the company maintains open relations with murderous death squads
as part of a program to intimidate trade union leaders 38 One plaintiff is
the estate of a man who was killed while working at the Coke plant.
Plaintiffs allege that Coke employees either ordered the violence directly,
or delegated the 4ob to paramilitary death squads that were acting as
agents for Coke. Moreover, plaintiffs argue that Coke knew about and
benefited from the systematic repression of trade union rights.5° The
corporation denies having any notice of wrongdoing in their plants, and
expects all its employees and associates to abide by a business code of
conduct dating back to 1980. l
E. Alternatives
A legislation- based strategy might more effectively pierce the
corporate veil of human rights abuses and environmental destruction by
empowering citizens and lawyers to strengthen the existing possible
causes of action with extensions of liability and creation of citizen suits
for alien plaintiffs. The development of a normative framework
embracing an international- right- to- know may best ensure an effective
legal remedy for victims of harm caused by multinational corporations'
operations in foreign countries. Currently, a coalition of over two
hundred NGOs is working on a legislative and grassroots campaign to
adopt such a system. 2
Sets of substantive and/or procedural principles for social good,
known as codes of conduct, have proliferated in the past several years in
various forms.5 3 Individual companies have put forth principles to which
they pledge to adhere to, but these are largely if not all voluntary and
Bottling Plants in Colombia Use Paramilitary Security Forces to Murder,
Torture, and Kidnap Trade Union Leaders: Coke Controls All Aspects of
Production and Operation of its Bottling Plants and Allows Local Managers to
Engage in Systematic Human Rights Abuses, available at
http://www.globalexchange.org/colombia/pr07l901.html (last visited December




51 Jim Lobe, Coca-Cola to be sued for Bottlers' Abuses. Inter Press Service
(July 20, 2001) available at www.commodreams.org/headines01/0720-01.htm
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
52 This is the International-Right-to-Know Coalition. See www.irtk.org.
53 Natural Heritage Institute, supra note 41, at 8.
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connote no obligatory changes in behavior.5 4 The United Nations
launched the Global Compact, a program comprised of general principles
about the environment, labor, and human rights practices for
corporations." Companies sign on to the compact to express their
willingness to abide by the principles, but again, this voluntary effort
may serve more as a public relations tool for companies than as a
mechanism for positive change. Several other international organizations
have attempted to start codes, some with monitoring programs and
certification processes.56 Likewise, the United States, Europe, and a few
other countries have limited but existing laws for disclosure.!
7
However, all are plagued by the same fundamental weakness:
without legal liability, the programs have little leverage to enforce their
54 Elizabeth Erin Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations
Have No Incentive to Define Human Rights. MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE I 11
(2002).
55 The UN Global Compact in 1999 is a creed of nine principles of which three
relate to the environment, which corporations can pledge to abide by and strive.
For a background discussion of the United Nations Global Compact, see Alexis
Taylor, The UN and the Global Compact, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 975
(2001).
56 For an extensive discussion and comparative charts of the existing initiatives
surrounding the environment, human rights and labor, see Susan Ariel
Aaronson, Can Governments Promote Global Corporate Citizenship?
NATIONAL POLICY ASSOCIATION 2001; Susan Ariel Aaronson, Oh, behave!
Voluntary codes can make corporations model citizens, THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY, March/April 2001, at 40, available at www.npal.org [hereinafter
Global Citizenship]. Initiatives include: The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, the Global Sullivan Principles, the Caux Roundtable and Principles,
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES); the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) of the United Nations Environment Program; ICC
Charter for Sustainable Development (International Chamber of Commerce); the
Apparel Industry Partnership Code of Conduct of 1997 for domestic and
overseas apparel factories with monitoring procedures; the International Labor
Organization's Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy; the Fair Labor Charter Agreement (U.S.); Code of
Labour Practices; Ethical Trade Initiative Base Code; ICTI Code of Business
Practices; Responsible Care (U.S.) and Electronic Privacy Principles. See
Global Citizenship, supra at Appendix 2.57 See The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11001 et. seq. 1986; Title III of SARA and The Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552A (1974). Europe has the Aarhus Convention and the Seveso
Directive. Overall, Asia, Latin America, and Africa have relatively little
voluntary reporting.
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goals.58 Continued abusive corporate social practices demonstrate that
these approaches are inadequate, and corporations simply will not behave
on their own.59 Transnational litigation in U.S. courts can provide a




A. Reasons for Multiplicity of Lawsuits Against
MNCs
The term corporate accountability connotes legal remedies and
ramifications for a company's social practices. In contrast, the term
corporate social responsibility implies a voluntary approach to corporate
regulation in which no actionable liability exists.' The current business
climate is far from being comprised of "accountability" measures. At
best there have been attempts at corporate social responsibility. 2
Numerous sources call for a response to regulatory failures, the limits of
voluntary initiatives, and information gaps about corporate practices.
63
In the United States, numerous safety, health, environmental, and
labor laws, constrain a company.64 These laws emerged as Americans
58 See Meaghan Shaughnessy, The UN Global Compact and the Continuing
Debate About the Effectiveness of Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct, 2000
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 159, 163; Dickerson, Claire Moore.
Transnational Codes of Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the Playing Field
for Developing-Country Workers, 53 FLA. L. REv. 611, 651-67 (2001)
(proposing a mandatory code).
5 Sincerity Test for Codes of Conduct. EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, January
28, 2001 at 2, available at www.earthrights.org/news/codeconduct.html; See
Shaughnessy, supra note 58, at 1.60Aceves, supra note 22, at 38.
61 "When a corporation acts "responsibly," it means the company is conducting
its business activities in a reliable, trustworthy, credible manner.
"Accountability," however, means corporations must adhere to regulatory or
legal requirements or otherwise be held liable or face sanctions. The
fundamental difference between the two concepts is corporate accountability
requires independent oversight and enforcement mechanisms to ensure
compliance, whereas corporate responsibility relies on voluntary self-
regulation." Summit, Friends of the Earth, Corporate Accountability & the
Johannesburg Earth Summit at http://www.foe.org/WSSD/sixreasons.html.
62 Natural Heritage Institute, supra note 41, at 5-6.
63 Natural Heritage Institute, supra note 41, at iv.
64 Laws such as ECPRA (Emergency Planning and Right-to-Know Act), SEC
(Securities and Exchange Commission) laws and reporting requirements, OSHA
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became willing to place certain values above profit and limit businesses'
ability to function freely when their practices negatively affect human
health or environmental concerns. However, in today's globalized
economy, an American corporation can extract, manufacture, and
produce its products abroad and avoid the United States' legal
parameters. The corporation can then sell the products in the United
States, reaping profits from the exploitation of cheaper labor and
facilities abroad. Although many countries do have social and
environmental laws, most of those laws are significantly weaker and
countries are under tremendous pressure to issue exemptions or turn a
blind eye to corporate practices. With foreign investment, they are more
likely to qualify for loans from international institutions such as the IMF
and World Bank even if the government and local people rarely receive
any of the profits from the business operations.
The ATCA litigation attempts to address the dilemma of global
markets operating under national regulation and ethics6 5 If plaintiffs
abroad can obtain jurisdiction in the United States against corporations
for their practices abroad, this strategy may begin to address the legal
loophole through rulings that provide direct remedial relief. The threat
of litigation can also deter corporations once they become aware that
they can be held accountable for behavior abroad.
1. Significance of Litigation for Foreign
Investments
Cross- border trade, investment, and production have increased
dramatically in the past several years, as well as the disparity among who
reaps the profits.66 U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows nearly
tripled over the last decade, and large multinational corporations are the
main engines behind this development 67  Their global networks and
operations wreak enormous impacts on the communities in which they
operate, yet there are few legal mechanisms to regulate their behavior. In
fact, the current competitive scheme for multinationals' investment
(Occupational Safety and Health), NLRA (National Labor Relations Act), and
the environmental legal regime including the CAA (Clean Air Act), CWA
(Clean Water Act), TSCA (Toxic Substances Control Act) and SDWA (Safe
Drinking Water Act).
65 For a discussion of this dilemma, see Natural Heritage Institute, supra note
41, at 5.
66 Natural Heritage Institute, supra note 41, at 2-3; JOHN ALLEN AND CHRIS
HAMNETT, A SHRINKING WORLD? THE SHAPE OF THE WORLD 2, EXPLORATIONS
IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 236 (Oxford University Press 1995).
67 Natural Heritage Institute, supra note 41, at 2.
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functions as a disincentive for countries to raise their social and
environmental standards. 68 Without global standards or accountability
measures, the competition for investment keeps standards "stuck in the
mud" with little catalysts for change
69
ATCA litigation may have a deterrent effect in which a
corporation will begin to think twice about conducting activities abroad
in ways that are contrary to what would be required at the least under
international law standards and at most what is required under U.S.
law.70 Accountability measures could help to slow or prevent a "race to
the bottom" in which companies are continually seeking out cheaper
wages, more clandestine practices, as well as places where they can be
aggressive and not be held responsible.71 The possibility of adjudication
and liability can "level the playing field" by providing protection for
those who have been previously exploited.
2. The Unocal Litigation
The Unocal litigation is the most noted and watched ATCA
claim to date. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., 72 a U.S. district court held that
the ATCA potentially covered litigation against oil companies accused of
conspiring or acting in partnership with the Myanmar (formerly Burma)
government to violate international law resulting in brutal environmental
and human rights harms. The case has not been heard on the merits, but
the 9th Circuit reversed an earlier Federal District Court's dismissal
decision to allow the case to go forward this year 73 A parallel state case
74going forward as well. It is the first case in U.S. history in which a
corporation will stand trial for abuses committed abroad.75
The Unocal case points in a positive direction for ATCA
litigants and those intending to bring future claims, as it allows
prosecution of non-state actors for violations of international law absent
68Natural Heritage Institute, supra note 4 1, at 5.69 Id. at 5.
70 Hall, supra note 13, at 422 (this report suggests the problems with the current
regulatory regime and emphasizes the need for policy and legal change).
71 Shaughnessy, supra note 58, at 2.
72 John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
73Press Release, Earthrights International, Unocal Can Be Held Liable For
Human Rights Crimes in Burma, Says Appeals Court Washington, D.C. (Sept
18, 2002) available at www.earthrights.org (last visited December 31, 2002).
74 Press Release, Earthrights International, Court Orders UNOCAL to Stand
Trial for Abuses in Burma: Burmese peasants and oil executives to meet in
California courtroom (June 11, 2002), available at www.earthright.org.
75 id.
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state action, and if they acted under the color of law.76 The district court
looked to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 jurisprudence to determine whether the
defendants had acted under the color of law. 7 The court found that
Unocal knowingly used forced labor but was not liable because it did not
control or commit the acts 78 However, the 9th Circuit seems to point in a
different direction.79 If the case proceeds favorably to the plaintiffs, it
could greatly expand the scope of substantive and jurisdictional ATCA
claims.
The Unocal case carries much significance for multinational
corporations evaluating their potential liability when making business
decisions.80 Companies should heed this warning that they may be found
liable not only for their own actions but also those of partners and joint
venturers, whether business or government.8' An effect of the Unocal
litigation may be that corporations may need to be more informed and
selective about which governments and companies they partner with. 2
76 Aceves, supra note 22, at 37. The required showing is a substantial degree of
cooperation between state officials and private parties. Id.
77 Aceves, supra note 22, at 37.
78 Lien, supra note 7, at 342.
79 Excerpts from U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Decision on John
Doe et al v. Unocal Co. et. al., September 18, 2002:
"There... is some evidence that Unocal could influence the [Burmese] army not
to commit human rights violations, that the army might otherwise commit such
violations, and that Unocal knew this."
"... IT]here is some evidence that Unocal knew that the Myanmar Military might
used forced labor in connection with the [Yadana pipeline] Project."
"The evidence also supports the conclusion that Unocal have practical assistance
to the Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor."
"The evidence also supports the conclusion that Unocal gave 'practical
assistance' to the Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to these acts of
murder and rape."
"Thus, because Unocal knew that acts of violence would probably be
committed, it became liable as an aider and abettor when such acts of violence, -
specifically, murder and rape - were in fact committed."
".. .[A]II torts alleged in the present case are jus cogen violations, and, thereby,
violations of the law of nations."
See Earthrights Press Release, supra note 74.
80 Aceves, supra note 22, at 37 (Aceves states that it is significant, I add that it is
the most important) (Aceves' article was published before the 9h Circuit
reversed the dismissal).
81 Id.; see also Lien, supra note 7, at 347.
82 Hall, supra note 13, at 401,422 (the author opines that if the Unocal plaintiffs
succeed, companies may have to restructure the very nature and scope of their
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IV. Doe v. Exxon-Mobil: ATCA Litigation Collides With
the War on Terrorism
A product of the ATCA and TVPA litigation against
multinational corporations for human rights violations abroad, Doe v.
ExxonMobil offers a unique twist to the corporate accountability case for
its role in the United States' war against terrorism. This section
examines the territorial, political, social and economic tensions that have
shaped Indonesia. Next, the origins of the Acehnese conflict and
ExxonMobil's impact in this province are discussed. Finally, this section
concludes by analyzing the actual allegations against ExxonMobil and
the repercussions of the Doe v. ExxonMobil lawsuit created in Indonesia,
in the United States, and in the international community.
A. Historical Background
Indonesia's recent history reveals a bitter and violent struggle for
independence that began at the start of the twentieth century in response
to over three hundred years of colonialism under the hands of the Dutch
and the Japanese occupation during World War 11.83 On August 17,
1945, the leaders of the independence movement announced the
establishment of the Republic of Indonesia with a provisional
government and constitution. 84  Nevertheless, actual independence
occurred four years later when the Dutch finally relinquished their hold
in Indonesia.85
However, the Dutch's presence in western New Guinea led to an
armed conflict with Indonesia when the latter tried to incorporate this
territory in the early sixties, ending in an agreement in August of 1962.6
The following year, Indonesia took over the administration of West
Papua. 7 In 1969, representatives of local councils in that territory
announced their consensus to remain part of Indonesia, which the United
Nations General Assembly recognized in a resolution. 88 Nevertheless,
overseas operations, wreaking enormous changes on U.S. MNC's foreign
operations).
83 U. S. Department of State, Background Note: Indonesia (2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748pf.htm .84 Id.
85 Id.
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some inhabitants of West Papua still seek independence from Indonesia,
even resorting to guerilla warfare.89
Simultaneously, Indonesia participated in territorial conflicts
outside its borders, notably in the adjacent island of East Timor 90 After
the Portuguese's departure from East Timor in 1975, the Marxist group
Fretilin rose to power.91 At the request of the Timorese opposition to
Fretilin, Indonesia invaded and took over East Timor. 92  Though
Indonesia subsequently proclaimed East Timor its twenty-seventh
province, the United Nations did not acknowledge this incorporation. 9
The latter aided Indonesia and Portugal negotiate the status of this
territory, and, in mid 1999, oversaw the direct ballot by which the people
of East Timor voted for their autonomy.94 Upon the revelation that
78.5% of the people voted for independence, deadly violence broke out.
95
Since then, The Indonesian government revoked its annexation of East
Timor.
96
Fluctuations in Indonesia's internal politics complicated its
precarious territorial situation. From 1949 until 1959, Indonesia
operated under a parliamentary system rendered weak by rebellions in
certain regions and disharmony among the political parties 97 In 1959,
President Sukarno reinstated the 1945 constitution and organized "an
authoritarian regime under the label of 'Guided Democracy."' 8 Under
his leadership, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) grew and by the
mid sixties directed the "mass and civic cultural organizations." 99 When
PKI started "arming its supporters" the Army interjected, leading to
violence between the rightists and the leftists, the ban of the communist
party, and undermining President Sukarno's leadership.'00 Leader of the
army and named provisional president by the People's Consultative







96 Id. The United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)
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years and was continuously re-selected by MPR until the late nineties.
101
Under Soeharto's "New Order," Indonesia concentrated on improving its
economy and on development under the leadership of the military "but
with advice from Western-educated economic experts."'
10 2
However, Indonesia's shaky economy in the last few years has
aggravated its already arduous journey to establish a full and complete
democracy. Early in Soeharto's last term, Indonesia's economy started
to crumble with the Asian financial and economic crisis, a drought, and a
significant decrease in the "prices for oil, gas, and other commodity
exports."'10 3 Popular demonstrations clamoring the fall of the rupiah, the
increase in inflation, and the acceleration of capital flight, caused the
MPR to select Vice President B.J. Habibie as the new president in May
of 1998.'04
President Habibie created a cabinet and sought help from the
International Monetary Fund and the international community for an
economic stabilization program.10 5  He released political prisoners,
promoted the freedom of speech and association, and organized elections
for the parliaments at all geographical levels 0 6 In October of 1999, the
MPR elected Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice
President. 107  However, "regional, interethnic, and inter-religious
conflict" in various areas of the country including Aceh plagued
President Wahid's endeavors for democratization and economic
growth.108 In August 2000, President Wahid decreed that Vice President
Megawati would control the daily administration of the government.
10 9
Less than a year later, Megawati ascended to the presidency."
10
The Aceh conflict, which depicts the political, economical, and
territorial tensions of Indonesian history, has become a central problem
for President Megawati. Joined to Indonesia as a result of Dutch
colonialism, Aceh is distinguishable because of its older version of
Islam, which "lacks the Hindu, Buddhist, and animist strains of Islam
101 Id.
102 Id.





110 Human Rights Watch, HRW Documents on Indonesia: The Indonesian
Military and Ongoing Abuses (2002), available at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/indo-bck07O2.htm.
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elsewhere in Indonesia," and its "language and literary tradition.""' To
the demands for separation by some inhabitants of the Aceh, the
Indonesian government has historically responded by using repression
through the use of military and police."1
2
The presence of foreign investments, especially oil companies
like ExxonMobil, has worsened the conflict. The Acehnese have come
to perceive that "energy revenues are diverted to benefit outsiders" rather
than their province.1  Today "80% of the government revenues"
produced by ExxonMobil's gas fields "are diverted back to Jakarta."
114
The Acehnese also resent the differences in the style of living of
ExxonMobil's employees of the Arun Project that reside in Bukit Indah,
the enclosed company neighborhood which "is a fenced-off and fortified
oasis of ranch-style homes and green lawns, a place where kids ride
bikes, carefree, on tree-lined streets." 115  More significantly, oil
companies like ExxonMobil, have entered into contracts with the
military to use as security from GAM's attacks on employees and its
sabotage of company property. 1 6 This type of arrangement has resulted
in violence not only against members of GAM but also against innocent
inhabitants:
[A]ccording to locals, riding . . . in front of
ExxonMobil's facilities has become a deadly game of
dodge-bullet, with soldiers taking potshots at just about
anybody who moves. Those who pass at the wrong time
of day are sometimes dragged into ExxonMobil's
warehouses and taught a lesson. New military camps
"' Rajan Menon, Another Year of Living Dangerously, THE NATIONAL
INTEREST (Fall 2001),
available at http://www.campaignexxonmobil.org/leam/news ni 091901.shtml.
112 Id. Between 1989 and mid-1998, General Suharto labeled Aceh as a
"military operational area" (DOM) and ordered Aceh's occupation by units of
his military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), which resulted in the killing,
torturing, and disappearances of numerous Acehnese civilians not linked to
GAM or any separatism movement. John Doe I et al. v. ExxonMobilCorporation
et al, Complaint for the Equitable Relief Damages, U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C., June 11,
2001, at 1-2, available at http://www.laborrights.org/proj.PDF.
113 Id.
14 Mark R. Mitchell Lhokseumawe & Jason Tedjasukmana, The Unmaking of a
President, TIME, Aug. 6, 2001, available at
http://www.campaignexxonmobil.org/learn/newstime_080601 .html.
115 Id.
116 Menon, supra note 111.
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have been established at 500 intervals along the
company's pipeline. By night, troops from these camps
go to new settlements in search of food, women and
(sometimes) rebels. If they don't find what they're
looking for, they break homes and bones.'
1 7
Attempts at concluding the Aceh conflict through ceasefires
between the Indonesian army and GAM demanding the independence of
this province have failed." 8 Even diplomatic efforts such as mediation
through foreign parties have not resulted in the termination of this
conflict." 9 Human rights activists in the region have encountered
outright violence or lack of success. A report issued in 1998 to Mobil
Oil (issued prior to its merger with Exxon in 1999) by "a coalition of 17
local human rights groups" discussed the company's deliberate ignorance
of the troops' use of "the corporation's earthmoving equipment to bury
their victims in mass graves."'120 Despite the company's inclusion of
clauses forbidding the troops from using the gas fields for their
"offensive operations," numerous reports by local residents state that this
preventive measure has been ineffective because both the company's
"7 Mitchell, supra note 114. See also John Doe I et al. v.
ExxonMobilCorporation et al, Complaint for the Equitable Relief Damages,
U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C., June 11, 2001, at 14-17, available at
http://www.laborrights.org/proj.PDF. Interestingly, the separatists first started
targeting Mobil Corp and its subsidiaries (now known as ExxonMobil Corp.)
due to the corporation's ties to the unpopular Suharto regime. Id. at 14. Mobil
exchanged payments through shares in its stock for the Suharto family in return
for the permission to extract and liquefy oil and gas in Aceh. Id. Though
General Suharto is no longer in power, the security contracts between the
government and the oil companies have continued and the number of troops
augmented at the request of ExxonMobil so that it could resume its operations in
Aceh. Id. at 17.
118 Human Rights Watch, HRW Documents on Indonesia: The Indonesian
Military and Ongoing Abuses, July 2002, available at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/indo-bck0702.htm. Since the writing of
this article, Indonesia and Aceh signed a "cessation of hostilities" on December
9, 2002. The Peacemakers from Switzerland, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 2002,
at 53. The Henry Dunant Centre will be in charge of the "peace operation,"
which will delineate "peace zones" for the storage of GAM's weapons. Id. If
history is any indicator, the quest for independence by the Acehnese and the
violence will continue for a long time.
119 Id.120 Mitchell, supra note 114.
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property and equipment have been used by the military for security
matters.121
B. The Legal Action and the U.S. Government's
Response
Faced with by this situation, local residents affected by the
security troops' activities took action. The International Labor Rights
Fund122 represented seven men, on behalf of themselves, and three
women, both as themselves and as the administrators of the estates of
their deceased spouses [collectively referred to hereafter as the Plaintiffs]
and filed a complaint against ExxonMobil Corporations, ExxonMobil Oil
Indonesia, Inc., Mobil Corporation, and PT Arun LNG, Co. [collectively
referred to hereafter as the Defendants]. 23 The Plaintiffs used the
pseudonyms "John Doe" and "Jane Doe" to maintain their anonymity.
This choice reflects their fear that the disclosure of their identity or that
of their village would endanger both their lives and the lives of "their
fellow villagers.' 24
The Plaintiffs alleged that they have suffered injury from the
Indonesian military hired as security on the worksites -"the operation of
their natural gas extraction and processing facilities- of the defendants in
Aceh.' '125 The Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment, compensatory and
punitive damages, and injunctive relief for "serious human rights abuses,
121 id.
122 The International Labor Rights Fund is a nonprofit advocacy organization
based in Washington D.C. dedicated to promoting a "just and humane treatment
of workers" everywhere. See http://www.laborrights.org/.
123 John Doe I et al v. ExxonMobilCorporation et al, Complaint for the Equitable
Relief Damages, U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C., June 11, 2001, at.1-2, available at
http://www.laborrights.org/proj.PDF. ExxonMobil Corp. is the result of a
merger between Exxon and Mobil Corp. on November 30, 1999. Id. at 7. Mobil
Corp. is the wholly owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil. Id. at 8. Mobil Oil Corp.
is the wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil Corp. Id. at 9. Mobil Oil Indonesia,
Inc. (MOI) was originally the subsidiary of Mobil Oil responsible for the
development of oil and natural gas fields in Indonesia including at Arun in
Indonesia. Now it is known as Exxon Mobil Indonesia, Inc. (EMOI) and is a
subsidiary of Exxon Mobil. Id. at 10. PT Arun consists of "a joint venture
company that is owned 55% by Indonesia's state owned oil and gas company,
Pertamina, 35% by Exxon Mobil, and 10% by" Japan Indonesia LNG Company,
Limited. Id. at 11. Together, these companies exploit an LNG Project in the
Arun area of Aceh, where ExxonMobil (originally Mobil) extracts natural gas
and PT Arun liquefies it. Id. at 12-3.
114 Id. at 3-7.
125 Id. at 2.
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including genocide, murder, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual
violence, and kidnapping in violation of ATCA, 26  TVPA, 27
international human rights law, and the statutory and common tort law of
the District of Columbia."'
128
The Plaintiffs explain that their choice of the United States
District Court is the appropriate forum for their claims. They further
argue that they have no "access to an independent or functioning legal
system within Indonesia" that would hear their complaints. 129 Moreover,
the Plaintiffs fear punitive retaliation from the Indonesian militaries if
they were to bring their complaints to the latter! 30  Additionally, the
Plaintiffs assert that they have made their claims to the United States
Court "within a reasonable time."'131 Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that the
United District Court for the District of Columbia possesses "jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the ATCA and the TVPA for the
international human rights violations.132 They reason that jurisdiction
over the state law causes of action under the 28 U.S.C. § 1367.13 They
add that D.C. Statutes § 13-423 provides the Court with personal
jurisdiction over the Defendants. 34 As for venue, the Plaintiffs claim
that it lies in the Judicial District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) and (c).
135
Reacting to the Plaintiffs' complaint, the Honorable Louis F.
Oberdofer from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia sent a letter to the Department of State on May 10th, 2002,
seeking direction.' 36 In the letter, Judge Oberdofer requested for a "non-
binding" opinion by the Department of State as to the "adverse impact,"
if any, of the adjudication of the lawsuit on "interests of the United
States" and the extent of said impact.137  Shortly thereafter, in June,
sixteen congressmen and two U.S. senators asked the State Department
126 Id. ACTA is situated at 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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not to get involved in the case, warning that "intervention" would convey
"the wrong message: that the United States supports the climate of
impunity for human-rights abuses in Indonesia." '18 Nonetheless, the
U.S. State Department issued a response dated July 29, 2002, relegating
its focus to the U.S. interests potentially affected by the lawsuit, not by
the legal issues presented by the letter.
13
In its urgent answer to Judge Oberdofer's request, the
Department of State offers several reasons to indicate that the
adjudication of the lawsuit would have an adverse impact on U.S.
interests. 40 Prior to expanding on these reasons, the Department of State
declares its opposition to the human rights violations by "elements of the
Indonesian armed forces in locations such as Aceh.' 4' The Department
of State adds that long lasting peace to the "Aceh conflict that maintains
Indonesian sovereignty can only be achieved if the military and police
end human rights abuses.' 42 Simultaneously, the Department of State
assumes an ongoing role in the process of terminating these abuses
through diplomacy and other methods. 43
The Department of State then turns to the adverse effects the
litigation would cause the United States. 144 Though it admits there is no
"certainty" to these effects, the Department of State still lists several
political and economic concerns the United States may have. 45 In
particular, the Department of State predicts that the Indonesian
Government may view this litigation as an affront to its sovereignty
46
More specifically, the Department of State believes the involvement of a
United Sates court in the adjudication of this matter will be deemed as an
attempt to put the Indonesian Government on trial for its civil war.
147
Furthermore, "[t]his issue presents special sensitivities for Indonesia
because it is deeply concerned about maintaining national cohesion in the
138 Peter Waldman & Timothy Mapes, Corporate Governance: Administration
Sets New Hurdles for Human-Rights Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002,
available at http://loper.org/-george/archives/2002/Aug/83.html.
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face of strong anti-government secessionist movements in Aceh and
elsewhere."
'1 48
Most importantly, the Department of State remarks that the
adjudication of Doe v. ExxonMobil would render the Indonesian
government uncooperative in areas that matter to the United States. In
particular, "the full spectrum of diplomatic initiatives, including
counterterrorism, military and police reform, and economic and judicial
reform" that the United States could use to help Indonesia would be
jeopardized. 49 Of greater emphasis for the Department of State,
however, is the impact of this case on the "United States efforts to secure
Indonesia's cooperation in the fight against international terrorist
activity."15  The Department of State explains the United States'
peculiar interest for Indonesia:
Indonesia is the fourth largest state in the world, with a
population of some 210 million. It is also the largest
Muslim nation, and serves as a focal point for U.S.
initiatives in the ongoing war against Al Quaida and
other dangerous terrorist organizations. U.S. counter-
terrorism initiatives could be imperiled in numerous
ways if Indonesia and its officials curtailed cooperation
in response to perceived disrespect for its sovereign
interests. 5
In addition to Indonesia's importance in the War against
Terrorism, the Department of State also advises that the adjudication of
this case would also upset the efforts of the United States in assisting
Indonesia in ending the human rights abuses there. 52 Specifically, this
case would impact two methods used by the United States to accomplish
the termination of human rights abuses in the Aceh province. First, the
adjudication of this case would affect the "improved training and support
of security personnel, as well as judicial reform," which "are designed to
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Secondly, the United States' goal to terminate human rights
abuses in Indonesia might also be affected because, as a consequence of
the adjudication of Doe v. ExxonMobil in the former, the latter might
reject U.S. companies' bids "for new contracts.' 54 Interestingly, the
Department of State depicts this potential reaction as carrying the most
negative impact for the Indonesian government. "Working side-by-side
with U.S. firms," indicates the Department of State, "Indonesian
companies and government agencies see the advantages of modem
business practices including transparency, respect for contracts, fair labor
practices, anti-corruption, efficiency, and competitiveness.'455 Not only
would Indonesia not be able to profit from the allegedl benefit to the
protection of human rights, it would also be relegated to contracting with
companies from other countries that "would be far less concerned about
human rights abuses, or about upholding best business practices.' 56
The Department of State comments that the economic and
political consequences on Indonesia's stability constitute another reason
for the United States not to adjudicate Doe v. ExxonMobil. However, the
Department of State frames its argument in a manner that concentrates
on the negative impact on the United States:
Given Indonesia's large population, resources, key
geographic location and proximity to key U.S. allies,
instability, there could create problems ranging from
interruption in vital shipping lanes, to refugee outflows,
to a new home for terrorists. To the extent this litigation
contributes to a worsening of the economic conditions in
Indonesia that breed instability it would adversely affect
U.S. interests. 57
The Department of State also observes that the litigation of the
case would worsen the already decreasing "foreign investment climate"
especially "in extractive industries in remote or unstable areas that
require security protection" and in oil and gas industries.158 Since the
financial crisis that hit it in 1997 and 1998, Indonesia must increase its




157 Id. at 3-4.
158 Id at 4.
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of revenues from the oil and gas sectors coming.159 Without these
efforts, Indonesia will not be able to "maintain a growing economy.'"
60
Consequently, the Department of State projects that "[e]fforts by the U.S.
and other donors to enhance Indonesia's fiscal sustainability through
debt rescheduling and international lending programs will be undermined
if Indonesia cannot sustain its own commitments.''
Moreover, the Department of State also expresses how crucial "a
viable, well-funded [Indonesian] central government" is to the United
States.162 First, more "public services" of heightened quality is essential
to decreasing poverty and keeping "political stability."163 Secondly, any
political instability in Indonesia might cause a chain reaction and harm
the "security of U.S. treaty allies Australia and Thailand" and other
regional areas. 64 Economic stability is required to fund and provide for
"properly trained and equipped security forces" that will not give in to
corruption. 165  The Department of State also adds: "Professional
personnel are also crucial for making progress on a host of U.S.
priorities, including promoting regional stability, countering ethnic and
sectarian violence, combating piracy, trafficking of persons, smuggling,
narcotics trafficking, and environmentally unsustainable levels of fishing
and logging.'
166
The Department of State concludes its letter by reminding Judge
Oberdofer that the adjudication of the case would both impact the U.S.
and Indonesian economies. The litigation would supposedly reduce
investment in Indonesia causing the latter's economy to suffer 167 This
case, if tried by a U.S. court, could cause a hostile reaction from
Indonesia, prompting the latter's government and private businesses to
rejects U.S. bids for "contracts in extractive and other industries.' 68 To
emphasize its points, the Department attaches a copy of the letter from
Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States, Soemadi Djoko M.
Brotodiningra to the latter's Deputy Secretary of State, Richard
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In this letter, dated July 15, 2002, Ambassador Brotodiningra
encourages for the dismissal of the lawsuit on various grounds. 69 While
qualifying the "allegation of abuses of human rights by the Indonesian
military against the separatist Free Aceh movement" as being, "at best
questionable," the Ambassador Brotodiningra employs jurisdictional,
economic, and political arguments to prevent the United States court
from hearing the lawsuit. 7 ° Ambassador Brotodiningra specifies that
this conflict is not one involving the United States for this is "an
allegation against an Indonesian government institution, e.g. the
Indonesian military, for operations taking place in Indonesia.'A71
Additionally, Ambassador Brotodiningra explains that the
litigation would have economic consequences. The lawsuit "will
definitely compromise the serious effort" of the Indonesian government
to guarantee the safety of foreign investments, including to particular
these from the United States.' 72 If this happens, Indonesia will have a
harder time securing "economic recovery. ' 173 Furthermore, the solution
to the Aceh conflict itself would be harmed by the adjudication of the
lawsuit.
174
In response to the letter issued by the Department of State,
ExxonMobil released a media statement on August 13, 2002, regarding
the lawsuit denying once more their involvement in any human rights
violations in the Aceh province of Indonesia.' 5 ExxonMobil alleges that
it or any of its subsidiaries operating in Aceh have not done any "direct
wrongdoing. 'i76 According to ExxonMobil, the real conflict alluded to
by the Plaintiffs revolves around "the conduct of the Indonesian military
in a civil war."'
177
ExxonMobil continues by focusing on the role of the Indonesian
government in the Aceh conflict. Under ExxonMobil's version of the
169 Id. The letter from Ambassador Someadi M. Brotodfmgratto Deputy
Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, is dated July 15, 2002 and is annexed to
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story, Pertamina, the national oil company of Indonesia, is the owner of
the Arun Field that are operated by an ExxonMobil affiliate.
1 78
Pertamina carries the responsibility for hiring security for the project in
Arun Field.179 In turn, the Indonesian government provides this security
to protect what it believes to be "a vital national industry. 80 Therefore,
ExxonMobil distances itself from what it characterizes as a civil conflict.
Under the aforementioned reasoning, ExxonMobil calls for the
dismissal of the lawsuit based on several reasons. 18 First, ExxonMobil
employs a separation of powers argument that has been recognized by
United States Courts. Specifically, ExxonMobil characterizes this
lawsuit as an issue of foreign policy thus mandating its dismissal "under
the constitutional principle that matters of foreign affairs should be
handled by the political branches of the government, not the courts. 82
Secondly, ExxonMobil implies the existence of a jurisdictional
problem, claiming the lawsuit concerns a conflict that solely involves
Indonesia. 183 In the words of ExxonMobil, "the case must be dismissed
because the plaintiffs seek to use a U.S. Court to judge the official acts of
the Indonesian government towards its own citizens engaged in a
regional rebellion.' 84 In other words, this conflict does not involve the
United States but, rather, has its roots in Indonesia and regards only
Indonesian parties.
To combat the negativity of the lawsuit, ExxonMobil reiterates
its longstanding relationship with Indonesia, emphasizing its economic
aspect. Thus, ExxonMobil remarks: "Between employees and
contractors, ExxonMobil affiliate operations in Aceh provide
employment for more than two thousand Acehnese and many more
through the subcontractors supporting its business in Aceh.' 85
Furthermore, the gas collected in the Arun Field fuels "the other major
businesses in North Aceh that also employ thousands of Acehnese;'4
86
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Moreover, ExxonMobil also argues its own role in preserving
and protecting human rights in Indonesia. Its efforts include offering
health care for two decades with the Civic Mission Clinic'
8
ExxonMobil also mentions its support for certain community projects
such as the maintenance of "schools."'18 9 Finally, ExxonMobil addresses
the construction of "water systems, roads, bridges" as projects related to
community development and the improvement of infrastructure. 90
Thus, Doe v. ExxonMobil is situated in a complex historical
background. The next section will explore the possible fate of this case.
C. Possible Effects of the Exxon-Mobil Case on
Corporate Accountability Litigation
Despite the possible positive influence of the Unocal decision,
the United States' position vis-h-vis Doe v. ExxonMobil is unlikely to
change because of its corporate agenda and foreign policy focused on
national security. The Department of State displays this attitude by
labeling the Aceh conflict a "civil war.' 91 This tactic purposefully
differentiates the separatist struggle in Aceh from the East Timor
situation. The United States perceives the latter as involving a valid bid
for independence. This is a view it formally expressed by cutting off all
financial and military aid to Indonesia after violence erupted following
the referendum that determined East Timor's independence in 1999.19
The United States could have maintained this strategy to send a message
that it opposed human rights violations by the Indonesian military and by
American companies.
However, the United States prioritizes its own economic and
political needs over the lives of the Acehnese inhabitants such as the
plaintiffs in Doe v. ExxonMobil. This attitude reveals that the United
States values oil and gas, especially since its access to these fuels may be
currently jeopardized by President Bush's inclusion of Iran and Iraq in
the "axis of evil" in his first State of the Union Address in the aftermath




191 See D.O.S. Letter, supra note 136.
192 Xinhua News Agency, Indonesian Minister says US is not intended to fight
Islamic Hardliners, July 31, 2002, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-
07/3 1/content 505952.htm.
'93 Powell, Rice Defend Bush's 'Axis of Evil' Speech, CNN.COM, Feb. 18, 2002,
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/02/17/bush.axis. National Security Adviser
Condoleeza Rice described the three countries included in the axis of evil- Iran,
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the oil rich states neighboring these two Middle Eastern Countries
towards the United States' anti-terrorism policy. Unsurprisingly, the
United States seeks to safeguard its ties to Indonesia- the fifteenth
biggest oil producer in the world and the sole Asian member of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 9 4 The United
States' will probably continue to do so in light of the increasing prospect
of its war against Iraq.
The deputy director of the International Labor Rights Fund,
Bama Athreya, stated that the current administration is much closer to
corporate interests than in the past. 195 In regards to the case in point,
Exxon Mobil was the second-largest campaign donor in the 2000
election cycle among oil and gas companies-- after Enron Corp. -- with
89% of its contributions going to Republicans, according to the Center
for Responsive Politics in Washington.96
Just as it is unlikely that the current U.S. administration will shift
towards a human rights protection, it is unlikely that the Indonesian
government will render Aceh independent. Indonesia needs ownership
over the latter's abundance of oil. Because "domestic demand for
petroleum" is increasing, Indonesia actually needs new oil reserves and
cannot afford to lose any existing reserves. 97 Without Aceh as its
province, Indonesia will exert less influence in OPEC. Furthermore,
Indonesia needs its oil production to strengthen its precarious economy
characterized by a huge external debt, budget deficit, and a falling
rupiah.19 8 However, military oppression of the Acehnese for security
purposes will only cause more violent retaliation of GAM against the
Indonesian Government and its business partners including
ExxonMobil.199
The United States favors preserving Indonesia's territorial
integrity, to continue having the largest Muslim state on its side in the
Iraq, and North Korea- as "oppressive regimes that are opaque [...] that have
been very, very harsh on their people" and "are aggressively seeking weapons of
mass destruction." Id. Her description characterizes these three countries as
rogue states depicting them to be as dangerous as any terrorist group.
194 See U.S. Department of State, Background Note on Indonesia, supra note 83.
195 See Walman & Mapes, supra note 138.
196 id.
197 See U.S. Department of State, Background Note on Indonesia, supra note 83.
198 See Menon, supra note 111. As of the fall of 2001, Indonesia had an external
debt of $ 65 billion, a budget deficit equal to 6.5% of the GDP, and a rupiah that
had fallen from 6,800 to the dollar in 1999 to 12,000 to the dollar in 2001. Id.
199Id.
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War Against Terrorism.2 °0 Consequently, the United States resumed its
military and economic aid to Indonesia in July and August, 2002, around
the time of the filing Doe v. ExxonMobil.2 1 Indirect military assistance
reserved for anti-terrorism purposes will allow Indonesian military
officers to attend an "international military education and training
program. ' 20 2 Secondly, the Indonesian police will get $50 million "over
several years" though a current "ban on weapon sales" will persist2
0 3
Both types of aid aim at fighting terrorism and ensuring that Indonesia
remains whole. Nevertheless, a risk exists that the separatists in the
Aceh province will be categorized as terrorists increasing the
involvement of the Indonesian military in Aceh.
Recent acts of terrorism within its territory have forced the
Indonesian government to cooperate more in the United States' war
against terrorism. The Indonesian government investigated, interrogated
and arrested suspected terrorists responsible for the bombing in Bali
resulting in 190 deaths in October 12, 2002.204 Assessing these efforts,
Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States, Soemadi D. M.
Brotodiningrat, declared that the United States could express confidence
in having Indonesia as a serious ally in combating terrorism./°s
Subsequently, President Megawati issued regulations for the detention
"of suspected terrorists for up to six months without charges" by
authorities, and "for the death penalty in extreme cases.'
06
Simultaneously, the Indonesian police have been investigating Islamic
radicals thought to be responsible for the two explosions in Sulawesi in
early December and possibly linked to "Jemaah Islamiyah," an "al
Qaeda-linked Southeast Asian militant group accused of plotting the Bali
200 See Xinhua News Agency, supra note 192.
201 Id. In July of 2002, the U.S. Senate Committee also voted to give "$400,000
to resume training of civilian elements of the Indonesian Defense Ministry."
Indonesia gets Us aid against terror, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2167588.stm.
202 See Xinhua News Agency, supra note 192.
203 Indonesia gets Us aid against terror, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2167588.stm.
204 Bemi K. Moestafa, RI- US. ties improving after Bali Bombing, Say
Ambassadors, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 17, 2002, at P2, available at 2002 WL
102098525.2 05 Id.
206 Ellen Nakashima, Megawati labors to fight terrorism while placating
moderates, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, at 26, available at 2002 WL
103950793.
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attacks. 2 °7  Though "only 31 percent of Indonesians" agree with
"America's war on terror," Indonesia's alliance in the fight against
terrorism appears to be crystallizing.
208
In light of these recent developments in the relationship between
the United States and Indonesia, the Acehnese plaintiffs in the
ExxonMobil case may see their case dismissed. In fact, it is the second
letter the State Department has sent urging dismissal of a human rights
case this year. Claims arising from the operations of Rio Tinto's copper
mine on the island of Bouganville in Papua New Guinea, for
environmental damages and human rights abuses were filed in a Federal
District Court in California.209 However, in March 2002 the Judge
dismissed the claim, relying on the statement of interest filed by the State
Department, citing similar reasons to that in the Exxon-Mobil/ Indonesia
letter.210 These reasons include adverse effects on US foreign policy
interests, interference with the Bougainville peace process," the [U.S.'s]
reputation for good governance in the eyes of international financial
institutions, foreign aid donors, banks, investors, trading and other
partners.21
The mine had been closed in 1989 after protests in the
Bouganville community, followed by ten years of civil war 212 Although
there is merit in the argument that the local conflict that could be affected
by litigation in the United States, the State Department succeeding in
sending a clear message that the company that committed abuses while
operating the mine should not be held accountable. In fact, Rio Tinto
PLC is the largest mining company in the world.21 3 Again, the focus on
economic benefit prioritized over human welfare and environmental
protection is embodied in the United States' foreign policy. Some
human rights advocates assert that the Bush administration is returning to
207 Timothy Mapes, Indonesia Finds New Terror Links: Ties Between Militants
May Be More Extensive Than First Thought, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2002,
at A1, available at 2002 WL-WSJA 104249662.
208 US' Image Pushing Asian Countries Into China's Embrace, STRAITS TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2002, available at 2002 WL 103123733. This lack of support results
from the Indonesian's perception of the United States "as a bully," an image that
may propel them towards another big power: China. Id




212 Project Underground, Drillbits, Vol. 7, No. 4, Apr./May 2002 at
http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/704/hotspots.html.
213 See Waldman & Mapes, supra note 138.
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a foreign policy akin to the Cold War era, in which the U.S. tolerates
egregious misbehavior by its allies.214
V. Conclusion
Could these State Department letters have a chilling effect on
ATCA litigation? At present it is too early to evaluate the effects in
Exxon-Mobil, because the case in still pending. However, the judge
adhered to the government's wishes in Rio Tinto. Yet, if the Unocal
litigation goes forward favorably to the plaintiffs, the scope of ATCA
litigation may expand for prosecution of corporate misbehavior in U.S.
courts.
With Doe v. ExxonMobil, the United States, through its judicial
and administrative officers, has the opportunity to render an American
multinational company accountable for human rights violations
committed on its behalf and under its knowledge. If taken, this approach
would further legitimize ATCA as a powerful tool and encourage
multinational companies to take a proactive approach to human rights
situations, creating and renovating their own policies towards the safety
and welfare of individuals, not just employees, present on and around
their property. However, the United States' own foreign policy centers
on the war against terrorism rather than on the protection of human rights
in what it considers a civil war in Aceh. Thus, for political and
economical purposes, the United States is willing to make concessions in
the human rights arena, in exchange for help from Indonesia in the war
against terrorism. The question that remains is whether the United
States' courts are willing to do the same.
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